Decentralization and mechanism design for online machine scheduling by Heydenreich, B. et al.
  
 
Decentralization and mechanism design for online
machine scheduling
Citation for published version (APA):
Heydenreich, B., Müller, R. J., & Uetz, M. J. (2006). Decentralization and mechanism design for online
machine scheduling. (METEOR Research Memorandum; No. 007). Maastricht: METEOR, Maastricht
University School of Business and Economics.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2006
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
Decentralization and Mechanism Design for
Online Machine Scheduling
Birgit Heydenreich?, Rudolf Mu¨ller, and Marc Uetz
Maastricht University, Quantitative Economics, P.O.Box 616,
6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands.
Email: {b.heydenreich,r.muller,m.uetz}@ke.unimaas.nl
Abstract We study the online version of the classical parallel machine
scheduling problem to minimize the total weighted completion time from
a new perspective: We assume that the data of each job, namely its re-
lease date rj , its processing time pj and its weight wj is only known to
the job itself, but not to the system. Furthermore, we assume a decen-
tralized setting where jobs choose the machine on which they want to
be processed themselves. We study this problem from the perspective
of algorithmic mechanism design. We introduce the concept of a myopic
best response equilibrium, a concept weaker than the dominant strategy
equilibrium, but appropriate for online problems. We present a polyno-
mial time, online scheduling mechanism that, assuming rational behavior
of jobs, results in an equilibrium schedule that is 3.281-competitive. The
mechanism deploys an online payment scheme that induces rational jobs
to truthfully report their private data. We also show that the underly-
ing local scheduling policy cannot be extended to a mechanism where
truthful reports constitute a dominant strategy equilibrium.
1 Introduction
We study the online version of the classical parallel machine scheduling prob-
lem to minimize the total weighted completion time – P | rj |
∑
wj Cj in the
notation of Graham et al. [1] – from a new perspective: We assume a strategic
setting, where the data of each job, namely its release date rj , its processing
time pj and its weight wj is only known to the job itself, but not to the system.
Any job j is interested in being finished as early as possible, and the weight wj
represents its indifference cost for spending one additional unit of time waiting.
While jobs may strategically report false values (r˜j , p˜j , w˜j) in order to be sched-
uled earlier, the total social welfare is maximized whenever the weighted sum
of completion times
∑
wj Cj is minimized. Furthermore, we assume a restricted
communication paradigm, referred to as decentralization: Jobs may communi-
cate with machines, but neither do jobs communicate with each other, nor do
machines communicate with each other. In particular, there is no central coor-
dination authority hosting all the data of the problem. This leads to a setting
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where the jobs themselves must select the machine to be processed on, and any
machine sequences the jobs according to a (known) local sequencing policy.
The problem P | rj |
∑
wj Cj is well-understood in the non-strategic setting
with centralized coordination. First, scheduling to minimize the weighted sum
of completion times with release dates is NP-hard, even in the off-line case [2].
Second, no online algorithm for the single machine problem can be better than
2-competitive [3] regardless of the question whether or not P=NP, and lower
bounds exist for parallel machines, too [4]. The best possible algorithm for the
single machine case is 2-competitive [5]. For the parallel machine setting, the
currently best known online algorithm is 2.61-competitive [6].
In the strategic setting, selfish agents trying to maximize their own benefit
can do so by reporting strategically about their private information, thus ma-
nipulating the resulting schedule. In the model we propose, a job can report
an arbitrary weight, an elongated processing time (e.g. by adding unnecessary
work), and it can artificially delay its true release date rj . We do not allow a job
to report a processing time shorter than pj , as this can easily be discovered and
punished by the system, e.g. by preempting the job after the declared processing
time p˜j before it is actually finished. Furthermore, as we assume that any job j
comes into existence only at its release date rj , it obviously does not make sense
that a job reports a release date smaller than the true value rj .
Our goal is to set up a mechanism that yields a reasonable overall perfor-
mance with respect to the objective function
∑
wj Cj . To that end, the mecha-
nism needs to motivate the jobs to reveal their private information truthfully. In
addition, as we require decentralization, each machine must be equipped with a
local sequencing policy that is publicly known, and jobs must be induced to se-
lect the machines in such a way that
∑
wj Cj is not too large. Known algorithms
with the best competitive ratio, e.g. [6,7], crucially require central coordination
to distribute jobs over machines. An approach by Megow et al. [8], developed for
an online setting with release dates and stochastic job durations, however, turns
out to be appropriate for being adopted to the decentralized, strategic setting.
Related Work and Contribution.Mechanism design in combination with
the design of approximation algorithms for scheduling problems has been studied,
e.g., by Nisan and Ronen [10], Archer and Tardos [11], and Kovacs [12]. In those
papers, not the jobs but the machines are the selfishly behaving parts of the
system, and their private information is the time they need to process the jobs.
A scheduling model where the jobs are the selfish agents of the system has
been studied by Porter [13]. He addresses a single machine scheduling problem,
where the private data of each job consists of a release date, its processing
time, its weight, and a deadline. In all mentioned papers, the only action of an
agent (machine or job, respectively) is to reveal its private data; the resulting
mechanisms are also called direct mechanisms. The model suggested in this paper
does not give rise to a direct mechanism, since in addition to the revelation of
private data, jobs must select the machine to be processed on.
In the algorithm of Megow et al. [8], jobs are locally sequenced according
to an online variant of the well known WSPT rule [9], and arriving jobs are
assigned to machines in order to minimize an expression that approximates the
(expected) increase of the objective value. This algorithm achieves a competi-
tive ratio of 3.281. The mechanism we propose develops their idea further. We
present a polynomial time, decentralized online mechanism, called Decentral-
ized LocalGreedyMechanism. Thereby we provide also a new algorithm for
the non-strategic, centralized setting, inspired by the MinIncrease Algorithm
of [8], but improving upon the latter in terms of simplicity. We show that theDe-
centralized LocalGreedy Mechanism is 3.281-competitive. This coincides
with the bound that is known for the non-strategic, centralized setting [7,8]. The
currently best known bound for the non-strategic setting, however, is 2.61 [6].
As usual in mechanism design, the Decentralized LocalGreedy Mech-
anism defines payments that have to be made by the jobs for being processed.
Naturally, we require from an online mechanism that also the payments are
computed online. Hence they can be completely settled by the time at which a
job leaves the system. We also show that the payments result in a balanced bud-
get. The payments induce the jobs to select ‘the right’ machines. Intuitively, the
mechanism uses the payments to mimic a corresponding LocalGreedy online
algorithm in the classical (non-strategic, centralized) parallel machine setting
P | rj |
∑
wj Cj . Moreover, the payments induce rational jobs to truthfully re-
port about their private data. With respect to release dates and processing times,
we can show that truthfulness is a dominant strategy equilibrium. With respect
to the weights, however, we can only show that truthful reports are myopic best
responses (in a sense to be made precise later). In addition, we show that there
does not exist a payment scheme extending the allocation rule of the Decen-
tralized LocalGreedy Mechanism to a mechanism where truthful reporting
of all private information is a dominant strategy equilibrium.
This extended abstract is organized as follows. We formalize the model
and introduce the required notation in Section 2. In Section 3 the Local-
Greedy algorithm is defined. In Section 4, this algorithm is adapted to the
strategic setting and extended by a payment scheme, yielding the Decentral-
ized LocalGreedyMechanism. Moreover, our main results are presented in
that section. We analyze the performance of the mechanism in Section 5, mention
a negative result in Section 6, and conclude with a short discussion in Section 7.
2 Model and Notation
The considered problem is online parallel machine scheduling with non-trivial
release dates, with the objective to minimize the weighted sum of completion
times, P | rj |
∑
wj Cj . We are given a set of jobs J = {1, . . . , n}, where each
job needs to be processed on any of the parallel, identical machines from the
set M = {1, . . . ,m}. The processing of each job must not be preempted, and
each machine can process at most one job at a time. Each job j is viewed as a
selfish agent and has the following private information: a release date rj ≥ 0, a
processing time pj > 0, and an indifference cost, or weight, denoted by wj ≥ 0.
The release date denotes the time when the job comes into existence, whereas
the weight represents the cost to a job for one additional unit of time spent
waiting. Without loss of generality, we assume that the jobs are numbered in
order of their release dates, i.e., j < k ⇒ rj ≤ rk. The triple (rj , pj , wj) is also
denoted as the type of a job, and we use the shortcut notation tj = (rj , pj , wj).
By T = R+0 × R+ × R+0 we denote the space of possible types of each job.
Definition 1. A decentralized online scheduling mechanism is a procedure that
works as follows.
1. Each job j has a release date rj, but may pretend to come into existence at
any time r˜j ≥ rj. At that chosen release date, the job communicates to every
machine reports w˜j and p˜j (which may differ from the true wj and pj )1.
2. Machines communicate on the basis of that information a (tentative) com-
pletion time Cˆj and a (tentative) payment pˆij to the job. This information is
tentative due to the online situation. The values Cˆj and pˆij can only change
if later another job chooses the same machine.
3. Based on this response, the job chooses a machine. This choice is binding.
The entire communication takes place at one point in time, namely r˜j.
4. There is no communication between machines or between jobs.
5. Depending on later arrivals of jobs, machines may revise Cˆj and pˆij. Even-
tually, the mechanism leads to an (ex-post ) completion time Cj and an (ex-
post ) payment pij of each job.
Hereby, we assume that jobs with equal reported release date arrive in some
given order and communicate to machines in that order. Next, we define an
online property of the payment scheme.
Definition 2. If in a decentralized online scheduling mechanism for every job
j payments to and from j are only made between time r˜j and time Cj, then we
call the payment scheme of the mechanism an online payment scheme.
We assume that each job j prefers a lower completion time to a higher one
and model this by the valuation vj(Cj | tj) = −wj Cj . We assume quasi-linear
utilities, that is, the utility of job j equals uj(Cj , pij | tj) = vj(Cj | tj)−pij , which is
equal to −wj Cj −pij . In this model, the utility uj is always negative. Therefore,
we assume that a job has a constant and sufficiently large utility for ‘being
processed at all’. Note that the total social welfare is maximized whenever the
weighted sum of completion times
∑
j∈J wj Cj is minimum, which is independent
of whether we do or do not carry these constants with us.
The communication with machines, and the decision for a particular machine
are called actions of the jobs; they constitute the strategic actions jobs can take
in the non-cooperative game induced by the mechanism. A strategy sj of a job
j maps a type tj to an action for every possible state of the system in which
the job is required to take some action. A strategy profile is a vector (s1, . . . , sn)
of strategies, one for each job. Given a mechanism, a strategy profile, and a
realization of types t, we denote by uj(s, t) the utility that agent j receives.
1 A job could even report different values to different machines. However, we prove
existence of equilibria where the jobs do not make use of that option.
Definition 3. A strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) is called a dominant strategy
equilibrium if for all jobs j ∈ J , all types t of the jobs, all strategies s˜−j of the
other jobs, and all strategies s˜j that j could play instead of sj,
uj((sj , s˜−j), t) ≥ uj((s˜j , s˜−j), t) .
We could simplify notation if we restricted ourselves to direct mechanisms,
that is mechanisms in which the only action of a job is to report its type. However,
a decentralized online scheduling mechanism requires that jobs decide themselves
on which machine they are scheduled. Since these decisions are likely to influence
the utility of the jobs, they have to be modelled as actions in the game. Therefore,
it is not sufficient to restrict oneself to direct mechanisms.
We will see that the mechanism proposed in this paper does not have a
dominant strategy equilibrium, whatever modification we might apply to the
payment scheme. However, a weaker equilibrium concept applies, which we define
next. That definition uses the concept of the tentative utility, i.e., the utility a
job would have if it was the last to be accepted on its machine.
Definition 4. Given a decentralized, online scheduling mechanism as in Def-
inition 1, a strategy profile s, and type profile t. Let Cˆj and pˆij denote the
tentative completion time and the tentative payment of job j at time r˜j. Then
uˆj(s, t) := Cˆwj − pˆij denotes j’s tentative utility at time r˜j.
If s and t are clear from the context, we will use uˆj as short notation.
Definition 5. A strategy profile (s1, . . . , sn) is called a myopic best response
equilibrium, if for all jobs j ∈ J , all types t of the jobs, all strategies s˜−j of the
other jobs and all strategies s˜j that j could play instead of sj,
uˆj((sj , s˜−j), t) ≥ uˆj((s˜j , s˜−j), t).
2.1 Critical jobs
For convenience of presentation, we make the following assumption for the main
part of the paper. Fix some constant 0 < α ≤ 1 that will be discussed later.
Let us call jobs critical if rj < αpj . Intuitively, a job is critical if it is long and
appears comparably early in the system. The assumption we make is that such
critical jobs do not exist, that is
rj ≥ αpj for all jobs j ∈ J .
This assumption is a tribute to the desired performance guarantee, and in fact, it
is well known that critical jobs must not be scheduled early to achieve constant
competitive ratios [5,7]. However, this assumption is only made due to cosmetic
reasons. In Section 5.1, we show how to relax this assumption, and we discuss
how critical jobs can be dealt with.
3 The LocalGreedy Algorithm
We next formulate an online scheduling algorithm that is inspired by the Min-
Increase Algorithm from Megow et al. [8]. For the time being, we assume that
the job characteristics such as release date rj , processing time pj and indifference
cost wj are given. In the next section, we discuss how to turn this algorithm into
a mechanism for the strategic, decentralized setting that we aim at.
The idea of the algorithm is that each machine uses (an online version of)
the well known WSPT rule [9] locally. More precisely, each machine implements
a priority queue containing the not yet scheduled jobs that have been assigned
to the machine. The queue is organized according to WSPT, that is, jobs with
higher ratio wj/pj have higher priority. In case of ties, jobs with lower index
have higher priority. As soon as the machine falls idle, the currently first job
from this priority queue is scheduled (if any). Given this local scheduling policy
on each of the machines, any arriving job is assigned to that machine were the
increase in the objective
∑
wj Cj is minimal.
Algorithm 1: LocalGreedy algorithm
Local Sequencing Policy:
Whenever a machine becomes idle, it starts processing the job with highest
(WSPT) priority among all jobs assigned to it.
Assignment:
(1) At time rj job j arrives; the immediate increase of the objective
∑
wj Cj ,
given that j is assigned to machine i, is
z(j, i) := wj
[
rj + bi(rj) +
∑
k∈H(j)
k→i
k<j
Sk≥rj
pk + pj
]
+ pj
∑
k∈L(j)
k→i
k<j
Sk>rj
wk.
(2) Job j is assigned to machine ij ∈ argmini∈M z(j, i) with minimum index.
In the formulation of the algorithm, we utilize some shortcut notation. We
let j → i denote the fact that job j is assigned to machine i. Let Sj be the time
when job j eventually starts being processed. For any job j, H(j) denotes the set
of jobs that have higher priority than j, H(j) = {k ∈ J |wkpj > wjpk} ∪ {k ≤
j |wkpj = wjpk}. Note that H(j) includes j, too. Similarly, L(j) = J \ H(j)
denotes the set of jobs with lower priority. At a given point t in time, machine
i might be busy processing a job. We let bi(t) denote the remaining processing
time of that job at time t, i.e., at time t machine i will be blocked during bi(t)
units of time for new jobs. If machine i is idle at time t, we let bi(t) = 0.
Clearly, the LocalGreedy algorithm still makes use of central coordination
in Step (2). In the sequel we will introduce payments that allow to transform
the algorithm into a decentralized online scheduling mechanism.
4 Payments for Myopic Rational Jobs
The payments we introduce can be motivated as follows: A job j pays at the
moment of its placement on one of the machines an amount that compensates
the decrease in utility of the other jobs. The final payment of each job j re-
sulting from this mechanism will then consist of the immediate payment j has
to make when selecting a machine and of the payments j receives when be-
ing displaced by other jobs. We will prove that utility maximizing jobs have
an incentive to report truthfully and to choose the machine that the Local-
GreedyAlgorithm would have selected, too. Furthermore, the WSPT rule can
be run locally on every machine and does not require communication between
the machines. We will see in the next section that this yields a constant-factor
approximation of the off-line optimum, given that the jobs behave rationally.
The algorithm including the payments is displayed below as the Decentral-
ized LocalGreedyMechanism. Let the indices of the jobs be defined according
to the reported release dates, i.e. j < k ⇒ r˜j ≤ r˜k. Let H˜(j) and L˜(j) be defined
analogously to H(j) and L(j) on the basis of the reported weights.
Algorithm 2: DecentralizedLocalGreedyMechanism
Local Sequencing Policy:
Whenever a machine becomes idle, it starts processing the job with highest
(WSPT) priority among all available jobs queuing at this machine.
Assignment:
(1) At time r˜j job j arrives and reports a weight w˜j and a processing time p˜j
to all machines.
(2) Every machine i computes
Cˆj(i) = r˜j + bi(r˜j) +
∑
k∈H˜(j)
k→i
k<j
Sk≥r˜j
p˜k + p˜j and pˆij(i) = p˜j
∑
k∈L˜(j)
k→i
k<j
Sk>r˜j
w˜k.
and informs j about both Cˆj(i) and pˆij(i).
(3) Job j chooses a machine ij ∈M . Its tentative utility for being queued at
machine i is uˆj(i) := −wjCˆj(i)− pˆij(i).
(4) The job is queued at ij according to WSPT among all currently available
jobs on ij whose processing has not started yet. The payment pˆij(ij) has to
be paid by j.
(5) The (tentative) completion time for every job k with k ∈ L˜(j), k → ij ,
k < j, Sk > r˜j increases by p˜j due to j ’s presence. As compensation, k
receives a payment of w˜kp˜j .
The DecentralizedLocalGreedyMechanism together with the stated
payments results in a balanced budget for the scheduler. That is, the payments
paid and received by the jobs sum up to zero, since every arriving job imme-
diately makes its payment to the jobs that are displaced by it. Notice that the
payments are made online in the sense of Definition 2.
Theorem 1. Regard any type vector t, any strategy profile s and any job j
such that j reports (r˜j , p˜j , w˜j) and chooses machine m˜ ∈M . Then changing the
report to (r˜j , p˜j , wj) and choosing a machine that maximizes its tentative utility
at time r˜j does not decrease j’s tentative utility under the Decentralized
LocalGreedyMechanism.
Proof. We only give the idea here. For the single machine case, an arriving job
j gains tentative utility p˜kwj − p˜jw˜k from displacing an already present job k.
WSPT assigns j in front of k if and only if p˜kw˜j − p˜jw˜k > 0. Thus, w˜j = wj
maximizes j’s tentative utility. For m > 1, the theorem follows from the fact
that j can select a machine itself. uunionsq
Lemma 1. Consider any job j ∈ J . Then, under the Decentralized Local-
GreedyMechanism, for all reports of all other agents as well as all choices of
machines of the other agents, the following is true:
(a) If j reports w˜j = wj, then the tentative utility when queued at any of the
machines will be preserved over time, i.e. it equals j’s ex-post utility.
(b) If j reports w˜j = wj, then selecting the machine that the LocalGreedy
Algorithm would have selected maximizes j’s ex-post utility.
Proof. See full version of the paper. uunionsq
Theorem 2. Consider the restricted strategy space where all j ∈ J report w˜j =
wj. Then the strategy profile where all jobs j truthfully report r˜j = rj, p˜j = pj
and choose a machine that maximizes uˆj is a dominant strategy equilibrium
under the Decentralized LocalGreedyMechanism.
Proof. Let us start with m = 1. Suppose w˜j = wj , fix any pretended release date
r˜j and regard any p˜j > pj . Let uj denote j’s (ex-post) utility when reporting
pj truthfully and let u˜j be its (ex-post) utility for reporting p˜j . As w˜j = wj ,
the ex-post utility equals in both cases the tentative utility at decision point r˜j
according to Lemma 1(a). Let us therefore regard the latter utilities. Clearly,
according to the WSPT-priorities, j’s position in the queue at the machine for
report pj will not be behind its position for report p˜j . Let us divide the jobs
already queuing at the machine upon j’s arrival into three sets: Let J1 = {k ∈
J | k < j, Sk > r˜j , w˜k/p˜k ≥ wj/pj}, J2 = {k ∈ J | k < j, Sk > r˜j , wj/pj >
w˜k/p˜k ≥ wj/p˜j} and J3 = {k ∈ J | k < j, Sk > r˜j , wj/p˜j > w˜k/p˜k}. That is,
J1 comprises the jobs that are in front of j in the queue for both reports, J2
consists of the jobs that are only in front of j when reporting p˜j and J3 includes
only jobs that queue behind j for both reports. Therefore, u˜j − uj equals
−
∑
k∈J1∪J2
wj p˜k −
∑
k∈J3
p˜jw˜k − wj p˜j −
(
−
∑
k∈J1
wj p˜k −
∑
k∈J2∪J3
pjw˜k − wjpj
)
=
∑
k∈J2
(pjw˜k − wj p˜k)−
∑
k∈J3
(p˜j − pj)w˜k − wj(p˜j − pj).
According to the definition of J2, the first term is smaller than or equal to zero.
As p˜j > pj , the whole right hand side becomes non-positive. Therefore u˜j ≤ uj ,
i.e. truthfully reporting pj maximizes j’s ex-post utility on a single machine.
Let us now fix w˜j = wj and any p˜j ≥ pj and regard any false release date
r˜j > rj . There are two effects that can occur when arriving later than rj . Firstly,
jobs queued at the machine already at time rj may have been processed or may
have started receiving service by time r˜j . But either j would have had to wait for
those jobs anyway or it would have increased its immediate utility at decision
point rj by displacing a job and paying the compensation. So, j cannot gain
from this effect by lying. The second effect is that new jobs have arrived at the
machine between rj and r˜j . Those jobs either delay j’s completion time and j
looses the payment it could have received from those jobs by arriving earlier.
Or the jobs do not delay j’s completion time, but j has to pay the jobs for
displacing them when arriving at r˜j . If j arrived at time rj , it would not have to
pay for displacing such a job. Hence, j cannot gain from this effect either. Thus
the immediate utility at time rj will be at least as large as its immediate utility
at time r˜j . Therefore, j maximizes its immediate utility at time r˜j by choosing
r˜j = rj . As w˜j = wj , it follows from Lemma 1(a) that choosing r˜j = rj also
maximizes the job’s ex-post utility on a single machine.
For m > 1, note that on every machine, the immediate utility of job j at de-
cision point r˜j is equal to its ex-post utility and that j can select a machine itself
that maximizes its immediate utility and therefore its ex-post utility. Therefore,
given that w˜j = wj , a job’s ex-post utility is maximized by choosing r˜j = rj ,
p˜j = pj and, according to Lemma 1(b), by choosing a machine that minimizes
the immediate increase in the objective function. uunionsq
Theorem 3. Given the types of all jobs, the strategy profile where each job j
reports (r˜j , p˜j , w˜j) = (rj , pj , wj) and chooses a machine maximizing its tenta-
tive utility uˆj is a myopic best response equilibrium under the Decentralized
LocalGreedyMechanism.
Proof. Regard job j. According to the proof of Theorem 1, uˆj on any machine
is maximized by reporting w˜j = wj for any r˜j and p˜j . According to Theorem 2
and Lemma 1(b), p˜j = pj , r˜j = rj and choosing a machine that maximizes j’s
tentative utility at time r˜j maximize j’s ex-post utility if j truthfully reports
w˜j = wj . According to Lemma 1(a) this ex-post utility is equal to uˆj if j reports
w˜j = wj . Therefore, any job j maximizes uˆj by truthful reports and choosing
the machine as claimed. uunionsq
Given the restricted communication paradigm, jobs do not know at their
arrival which jobs are already queuing at the machines and what reports the
already present jobs have made. Therefore it is easy to see that for any non-
truthful report of an arriving job about its weight, instances can be constructed
in which this report yields a strictly lower utility for the job than a truthful report
would have given. With arguments similar to those in the proof of Theorem 2,
the same holds for false reports about the processing time and the release date.
5 Performance of the Mechanism
As shown in Section 4, jobs have a motivation to report truthfully about their
data: According to Theorem 1, it is a myopic best response for a job j to report
the true weight wj , no matter what the other jobs do and no matter which
p˜j and r˜j are reported by j itself. Given a true report of wj , it was proven in
Theorem 2 that reporting the true processing time and release date as well as
choosing a machine maximizing the tentative utility at arrival maximizes the
job’s ex-post utility. Therefore we will call a job rational if it truthfully reports
wj , pj and rj and chooses a machine maximizing its tentative utility uˆj . In this
section, we will show that if all jobs are rational, then the Decentralized
LocalGreedyMechanism is 3.281-competitive.
5.1 Handling Critical Jobs
Recall that from Section 2.1 on, we assumed that no critical jobs exist, i.e.
that rj ≥ αpj for all jobs j ∈ J . We will now relax this assumption. With-
out the assumption, the DecentralizedLocalGreedyMechanism as stated
above does not yet yield a constant approximation factor; simple examples can
be constructed in the same flavor as in [7]. In fact, it is well known that early
arriving jobs with large processing times have to be delayed [5,7,8]. In order to
achieve a constant competitive ratio, we also adopt this idea and use modified
release dates as [7,8]. To this end, we define the modified release date of every job
j ∈ J as r′j = max{rj , αpj}, where α ∈ (0, 1] will later be chosen appropriately.
For our decentralized setting, this means that a machine will not admit any job j
to its priority queue before time max{r˜j , αp˜j} if j arrives at time r˜j and reports
processing time p˜j . Moreover, machines refuse to provide information about the
tentative completion time and payment to a job before its modified release date
(with respect to the job’s reported data). Note that this modification is part
of the local scheduling policy of every machine and therefore does not restrict
the required decentralization. Note further that any myopic rational job j still
reports w˜j = wj according to Theorem 1 and that a rational job reports p˜j = pj
as well as communicates to machines at the earliest opportunity, i.e. at time
max{rj , αpj}, according to the arguments in the proof of Theorem 2. Moreover,
the aforementioned properties concerning the balanced budget, the conservation
of utility in the case of a truthfully reported weight, and the online property of
the payments still apply to the algorithm with modified release dates.
5.2 Proof of the Competitive Ratio
It is not a goal in itself to have a truthful mechanism, but to use the truthfulness
in order to achieve a reasonable overall performance in terms of the social wel-
fare
∑
wj Cj . We derive a constant competitive ratio for the Decentralized
LocalGreedyMechanism by the following theorem:
Theorem 4. Suppose every job is rational in the sense that it reports rj, pj, wj
and selects a machine that maximizes its tentative utility at arrival. Then the
Decentralized LocalGreedyMechanism is %-competitive, with % = 3.281.
Proof. A rational job communicates to the machines at time r′j = max{rj , αpj}
and chooses a machine ij that maximizes its utility upon arrival uˆj(ij). That is,
it selects a machine i that minimizes
−uˆj(i) = wjCˆj(i) + pˆij(i) = wj
[
r′j + bi(r
′
j) +
∑
k∈H(j)
k→i
k<j
Sk≥r′j
pk + pj
]
+ pj
∑
k∈L(j)
k→i
k<j
Sk>r
′
j
wk.
This, however, exactly equals the immediate increase of the objective value∑
wj Cj that is due to the addition of job j to the schedule. We now claim that we
can express the objective value Z of the resulting schedule as Z =
∑
j∈J −uˆj(ij),
where ij is the machine selected by job j. Here, it is important to note that
−uˆj(ij) does not express the total (ex-post) contribution of job j to
∑
wj Cj ,
but only the increase upon arrival of j on machine ij . However, further contri-
butions of job j to
∑
wj Cj only appear when job j is displaced by some later
arriving job with higher priority, say k. This contribution by job j to
∑
wj Cj ,
however, will be accounted for when adding −uˆk(ik).
Next, since we assume that any job maximizes its utility upon arrival, or
equivalently minimizes −uˆj(i) when selecting a machine i, we can apply an
averaging argument over the number of machines, like in [8], to obtain:
Z ≤
∑
i∈J
1
m
m∑
i=1
−uˆj(i) .
The remainder of the proof utilizes the definitions of uˆj(i) and particulary the
fact that, upon arrival of job j on any of the machines i (at time r′j), machine i
is blocked for time bi(r′j), which is upper bounded by r
′
j/α. This upper bound
is machine-independent, and follows from the definition of r′j , since any job k in
process at time r′j fulfills αpk ≤ r′k ≤ r′j . Furthermore, the proof utilizes a lower
bound on any (off-line) optimum schedule from Eastman et al. [14, Thm. 1].
For details, we refer to the full version of the paper. The resulting performance
bound 3.281 is identical to the one of [8] (for deterministic processing times),
when α is (
√
17m2 − 2m+ 1−m+ 1)/(4m). uunionsq
6 Negative Result
Theorem 5. There does not exist a payment scheme that extends the Local-
Greedy algorithm to a truthful mechanism. Therefore, it is not possible to turn
the Decentralized LocalGreedyMechanism into a mechanism with a dom-
inant strategy equilibrium in which all jobs report truthfully by only modifying
the payment scheme.
Proof. If the Decentralized LocalGreedyMechanism can be turned into
a truthful mechanism by only modifying the payment scheme, then the Lo-
calGreedy algorithm can be completed by a payment scheme to a truthful
mechanism. Furthermore, we can show that a necessary condition for truthful-
ness, called weak monotonicity, is not satisfied by the LocalGreedy algorithm.
Weak monotonicity has been introduced in [15]. uunionsq
7 Discussion
It would be interesting to find a constant competitive decentralized online schedul-
ing mechanism such that there is a dominant strategy equilibrium in which
the jobs report all data truthfully. As we have seen in Section 6, the Local-
GreedyAlgorithm cannot be extended by a payment scheme such that the
resulting mechanism has the described properties. Furthermore, recall that the
currently best known performance bound for the non-strategic, centralized set-
ting is 2.61 [6]. This algorithm crucially requires a centralized distribution of
jobs over machines, and therefore does not seem to be suited for decentraliza-
tion. Nevertheless, it remains an interesting question to identify general rules for
the transformation of centralized algorithms to decentralized mechanisms.
Acknowledgements. We thank the referees for some helpful remarks.
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